Balkan media accuse Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) to support radical islamic network

According to the Serbian Televizija Republike Srpske - a Bosnian entity level public mainstream TV - Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s wife, is the patron of the weightiest humanitarian organization: Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH).

IHH is a radical Islamic organization, established in 1992 by a member of the Turkish Refah Party and formally registered in Istanbul in 1995. Besides its legitimate humanitarian activities, IHH supports radical Islamic networks. In recent years, it has prominently supported Hamas (through the Union of Good).

In addition, the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC) has reliable information that in the past IHH provided logistical support and funding to global jihad networks.

The Balkans, and specifically the western portion of them with Bosnia and Herzegovina, has become a major recruitment base for ISIS due to their high rates of unemployment and the growing size of marginalized sectors of society.

The Balkans is strategically important for ISIL as they serve as a major transit zone for foreign recruits to ISIL from various parts of the world. The Balkans are also important for ISIL for movements in the opposite direction, it is a transit point for operatives into Western Europe and a staging point for terrorist operations.

Belgian Intelligence stopped cooperation with Turkish MIT

Belgian Intelligence and Security Agency (VSSE) has stopped cooperation on terrorism with Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) as consequence of the action taken on mosque in Limburg.

According to Daily Sabah - a Turkish pro-government daily - "the procedure to withdraw the recognition of the Fatih Mosque in Beringen" has convinced supporters of President Erdogan that Belgian Intelligence are investigating their leader.

Euroactiv - a European media platform specialising in the online publication of articles focusing on European policymaking - reported that "the Flemish interior minister has taken action against a mosque supported by Turkey, whose imam is suspected of informing Ankara about supporters of Fethullah Gülen, the self-exiled cleric accused of being the mastermind behind last year’s failed coup".

Moldovan Intelligence Arrests Consul General in Istanbul for issuing documents allowing Arabs to enter Moldova

Moldovan Intelligence Agency arrests  Veaceslav Filip, Consul general in Istanbul. The diplomat was arrested at Chisinau international airport. According Moldovan website Deschide.md Veaceslav Filip is accused of bribery and passive corruption.

The information was confirmed by acting Prosecutor-General Eduard Harunjen.

The operation involved officers of the National Anticorruption Centre and the Moldovan Intelligence Agency (Information and Security Service).

According to prosecutors, Moldova's consul general in Istanbul Veaceslav Filip accepted bribes for issuing various consular documents.

Immediately after the detention, prosecutors searched the consul's house in Chisinau.

Veaceslav Filip is accused of issuing documents allowing citizens of Arab origin to enter Moldova and of repeat violations of the law on combating international terrorism.

Turkish Intelligence Reveals ISIL’s most important route for Raqqah

Investigations into the bomb attack that targeted the HDP (Peoples' Democratic Party) rally in Diyarbakir Province on June 5, 2015 led Turkish Intelligence to the discovery of ISIL’s most important transport route for Raqqah. 

According recent Turkish Intelligence reports Ilhami Bali aka “Ebu Bekir”, an ISIL’s border emir who is wanted by the Turkish Interior Ministry for his involvement in the June 5 attack, had set up a transport route via Gaziantep-Kilis-Raqqah.

Gaziantep-Kilis-Raqqah

Turkish Intelligence gathered informations that discovered a transport and logistics network setted up by Bali, Mustafa Demir aka “Ebu Ali”, Okkes Karabeyli aka “Ebu Sumeyye”, and Deniz Buyukcelebi aka “Ebu Enes” that required the collaboration of transport personnel, taxi drivers, smugglers, and porters.

Transportation and Logistics

Based on information retrieved by Turkish Intelligence from telephone records, an ISIL’s emir issues a reference known as “teskiye” for the jihadists and their families who wish to join the organization, and he instructs them to get to Gaziantep Province by bus or plane.

The list of the people due to arrive is then given to the organization’s customs unit that is known as “administration” which handles the border crossing. The customs unit passes on the names of those who arrive to Ilhami Bali who then takes over. Once in Gaziantep, jihadists call Bali to announce their arrival. Bali then confirms the community the jihadists are assigned to and the name of the emir who issued the reference after which he asks them to take a taxi to one of the 10 meeting points controlled by the organization.

ISIL Warehouse in Gaziantep

According Turkish Intelligence reports once they reach one of the meeting points recommended by Bali, the jihadists are met by an agent sent by a certain “Ebu Same” who takes them to guest houses that are used by ISIL as meeting locations either in Gaziantep or Kilis. 

After that, one of the nine taxi drivers who work for Bali takes the jihadists to the second meeting point in the town of Elbeyli in the province of Kilis. Jihadists pay a small fee of $15 to be taken by smugglers working for Huseyin Hano into ISIL-controlled areas. 

Depending on the size of the group of jihadists, a number of vehicles and porters are sent to carry the people’s luggage. Facilitating border crossing requires leaving jihadists’ excess luggage behind in a warehouse that is used by the organization in Gaziantep. 

Turkish Intelligence revealed that after crossing the border, the jihadists are taken by taxis to the customs unit where they complete their entry procedures. At that point, female jihadists are taken to the women’s guest house that is run by Deniz Buyukcelebi aka Ebu Enes, and the men are taken to a camp in Tall Ahmar. After completing their training, jihadists are taken to Raqqah and surrounding areas under the authority of the emir who issued the references.

Border crossing during Cobra’s Change of Guard

Border crossings from Syria into Turkey are handled by Mustafa Demir aka “Ebu Ali”. Bali monitors the process very closely and is constantly receiving updates until the jihadists reach Gaziantep Airport. 

A delegation called “hijra committee” at the customs unit thoroughly interrogates those leaving on their “hijrah” (in reference to the journey made by Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to Medina in 622).

Border crossings are handled by Mustafa Demir

Following the interrogation, those that are deemed good candidates to cross into Turkey are given permit papers called “Documents” by an emir called “Ebu Sam” and are asked to wait in one of the organization’s houses near the border. When the smugglers declare the border safe to cross, the jihadists are taken into Turkey.  

The crossings are timed to coincide with the Cobra’s change of guard. Turkish Intelligence revealed that smugglers that work without the knowledge of ISIL emirs are captured by villagers as ordered by the organization and are punished. Young people without luggage are given priority and cross the borders faster because they are used as fighters.

Recruits are not allowed to leave ISIL-controlled areas without a valid reason, and those who attempt to cross into Turkey without authorization are placed in the organization’s prison in Raqqah.

Six Cargo Ships Carrying Weapons for ISIL from Turkey to Libya

(June 26, 2016) - Six cargo ships or container carriers carrying weapons for ISIL in Libya left Turkish ports in mid-may having been located and identified by UK and French intelligence agents active in Turkey.

These large ships can carry over 10,000 tons of freight. They are two container carriers flying Turkish and Liberian flags and three cargo ships flying the Panamian, Bolivian, Tanzanian flags and a livestock carrier registered in the Comoros.

Each of them apparently conceals amid its cargo small caliber weapons for ISIL militias. After leaving a Turkish port each of the ships probably extinguished its GPS and it will be difficult to locate even with satellites above them.

"They were unable to flee via the Suez Canal or via Gibraltar. They are forced to circle in the Mediterranean. That's a major sensitive operation" a security source said to French newspaper Le Figaro.

According to the local sources it is almost impossible to know how is behind the ships: "Turkish Smugglers? Special services? I don't know" source said.